NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD v ALLESANDRO ZOLLO AND IOLANDA ZOLLO No. SCGRG 93/1794 Judgment No. 4988 Number of pages - 10 Equity (1995) 64 SASR 63 [1995] SASC 4988 (2 March 1995)

COURT
IN THE FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
KING CJ(2), MATHESON(1) and MILLHOUSE(3) JJ

CWDS
Equity - Interlocutory injunction - bank sues for money owed on loan
accounts secured by mortgages - liability under mortgages
disputed - Bank's
claim soon to be heard with two other actions involving the parties - Bank
appoints receiver of income pursuant
to mortgages - whether orders suspending
the appointment and restraining the Bank from revoking the suspension should
have been made
- Bank conceding that there was a serious question to be tried
- balance of convenience in favour of orders made. Law of Property
Act, 1936s
53(5). Inglis and Anor v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1972] HCA 74; (1972) 126 CLR
161; Glandore Pty Ltd and Ors v Elders Finance and Investment Co Ltd [1984] FCA 407; (1984) 4
FCR 130; Harvey v McWatters [1948] NSWStRp 58; (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173; Andreas and Angelatos and
Ors v National Australia Bank [1994] FCA 1223; (1994) ATPR 41-333; Mainbanner Pty Ltd and Ors v
Dadincroft Pty Ltd and Ors (1988) ATPR 40-896; Graham and Ors v Commonwealth
Bank of Australia (1988) ATPR 40-908; Canada Permanent Trust Co v Welton
(1973) 33 DLR (3d) 417; Argyle Art Centre v Argyle Bond and Free Stores (1976)
1 NSWLR 377; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia [1986] HCA 58; (1986) 161 CLR 148;
Meagher Gummow and Lehane 'Equity Doctrines and Remedies' 3rd Ed and Cayne v
Global Natural Resources PLC (1984) 1 All ER 225, considered.

HRNG
ADELAIDE, 8 April 1995
#DATE 2:3:1995
#ADD 1:5:1995

Counsel for appellant: Mr N J T Swan with him

Mr A J Crossman

Solicitors for appellant: Finlaysons

Counsel for respondent Mr W J N Wells
QC
Allesandro Zollo: with him Mr G W Dart

Solicitors for respondent: Ward and Partners

Counsel for respondent
Mr R F A Wills
Iolanda Zollo:

Solicitors for respondent Moody Rossi and Co
Iolanda Zollo:

ORDER
Appeal dismissed.

JUDGE1
MATHESON J In this action the appellant claims from the respondents monies
said to be owing to it on an instalment loan
account, on a personal loan
account and on a current account. As at the date of the hearing before this
court, the sum alleged to
be owing was $800,000 (including interest) with
further interest accruing at the rate of $221.73 per day. The respondents do
not
dispute the appellant's allegations that they have not made any payments
since 3 August, 1990. In addition, and in the same action,
the appellant
claims possession of three properties owned by the respondents, and comprised
in three certificates of title over which
the appellant has registered
mortgages. The respondents have filed separate defences and counterclaims,
both alleging inter alia
breach of fiduciary duty by the appellant, while the
second respondent does not admit that she signed the mortgages, and pleads
additional
defences.

2. On 27 June, 1994, the respondent appointed Bruce James Carter pursuant to
the mortgages "until such appointment is
revoked by the mortgagee or otherwise
terminated to be the receiver of the income of (the) mortgaged propert(ies)
and exercise all
or any of the powers conferred upon him by the terms of the
said mortgage(s) or contained in the Real Property Act, 1886 and the
Law of
Property Act, 1936."

3. On 28 June, 1994, the respondents applied for an order setting aside the
appointment of the receiver.
On 7 July, 1994, Prior J made the following
orders:
"... the defendants (now the respondents) by their counsel
undertaking
to abide by any order the Court or Judge may make as
to damages in the case the Court or a Judge should hereafter be
of the
opinion that the plaintiff (now the appellant) shall have
sustained any by reason of this order which the defendants ought

to pay IT IS ORDERED AND DIRECTED:-

1. That the plaintiff forthwith execute and serve upon the
receiver, Bruce James Carter,
an instrument having the effect of
suspending the appointment by the plaintiff pursuant to the
powers under registered Memoranda
of Mortgage No. 5030265,
4631949 and 5261440 of a Receiver of the income of the mortgaged
property being the property comprised
and described in
Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 2563 Folio 198, Volume
1820 Folio 100 and Volume 2008 Folio 183.

2. That subject to paragraph 3 hereof until further order
the plaintiff be, and is hereby restrained, whether by itself,
its servants agents or otherwise, from revoking the suspension
effected in accordance with paragraph 1 hereof.

3. That
the plaintiff forthwith serve, or cause the said
receiver to serve, upon each and every tenant to whom a Notice
of Appointment
has been sent, a further Notice in a form to be
agreed between the parties, or in default of agreement to be
settled by this
court, advising the recipient of the terms and
effect of this Order and in particular that until further order
the defendants
are the proper persons to whom to pay the rent
reserved under their leases/tenancy agreements with the
defendants.

4.
That the plaintiff be restrained from exercising its
power to further appointment of a Receiver of the income of
the mortgaged
properties.

5. That the question of costs be reserved.

AND further consideration of the application adjourned.

AND
the parties may be at liberty to apply."

4. The appellant now seeks an order setting aside those orders, and seeks an
order that the income from the mortgaged
properties be paid into Court.

5. It is convenient to mention here that the respondents are involved in two
other actions in this
Court in which the appellant is also a party. In Action
No. 1026 of 1993, the respondent Alessandro Zollo, (who is a builder and
who
suffered an injury on 4 June, 1990 allegedly rendering him permanently unfit
and unable to work as a builder), claims he is entitled
to the benefit of
insurance under an insurance agreement and an agreement to procure insurance.
In Action No. 2031 of 1990, the respondents
are suing the appellant for
damages for breach of an agreement to provide banking accommodation. In that
Action, they already have
a judgment in their favour, but damages have not yet
been assessed.

6. It is also convenient to mention here that on 6 February,
1995 Bollen J
made the following order:
"1. That the insurance action 1026/93 be heard as the
first action in March.

2. That the possession action 1794/93 be the next action
to be heard in March.

3. That the breach of contract action 2031/90
be heard
immediately following the other actions."

7. Mr. Swan, counsel for the appellant, referred to a number of cases
starting
with Inglis and Anor v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972)
126 CLR l61, where the High Court upheld the refusal of Walsh
J to grant an
interlocutory injunction. At p169, Barwick CJ said (Menzies and Gibbs JJ
concurring):
"The case falls fairly,
in my opinion, within the general
rule applicable when it is sought to restrain the exercise
by a mortgagee of his rights
under the mortgage instrument.
Failing payment into court of the amount sworn by the
mortgagee as due and owing under the
mortgage, no restraint
should be placed by order upon the exercise of the
respondent mortgagee's rights under the mortgage."

8. Mr. Swan then referred to the judgment of Morling J in Glandore Pty Ltd
and Ors v Elders Finance and Investment Co Ltd [1984] FCA 407; (1984) 4 FCR 130. His Honour
pointed out that Inglis' case was not a case in which the mortgagor sought to
impugn the validity of the mortgage transaction
itself. He then referred to
the decision of Sugerman J in Harvey v McWatters [1948] NSWStRp 58; (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173 and
said at p134:
"It was held in Harvey v McWatters that where a mortgagor
seeks an interlocutory injunction to restrain
his mortgagee from
selling, there is a distinction with respect to the terms that
will be imposed as to payment into court
between the case in
which the power of sale is admittedly exercisable and the only
dispute is as to the amount due or the
mode in which the
mortgagee proposes to exercise the power, and the case in which
the very matter in dispute is whether the
power of sale is
exercisable at all. Sugerman J held that, in the first case,
the general rule is that the mortgagor will
be required to pay
into court the amount demanded by the mortgagee, unless it
appears from the terms of the mortgage that
the amount claimed
by the mortgagee is wrong. He further held that in the second
class of case, the amount which would be
ordered to be paid into
court is not necessarily the whole amount claimed or appearing
to be due under the terms of the mortgage,
and in such a case
the terms as to payment into court that are imposed upon the
mortgagor may be moulded as to require payment
in of so much
only as will suffice to give adequate protection to the
mortgagee."

9. Later at pp135-136, Morling J said:
"I do not think that the present case is a case of the kind
to which the general principle in Inglis' case applies. It

falls more easily into the second class of case discussed by
Sugerman J in Harvey v McWatters. This being so I am not

constrained by authority to require the applicants to pay into
court the whole amount of the mortgage debt as a condition of
obtaining interlocutory relief. Rather I think the proper
approach is to mould an order so as to ensure adequate
protection
to the mortgagee and to otherwise do justice between
the parties during the period pending the final hearing.

Having regard
to the fact that the value of the security held by
Elders (at Elders' own valuation) is more than double the amount
of the
mortgage debt it is difficult to see how any prejudice
will be suffered by Elders by the granting of interlocutory
relief,
provided the final hearing is not unduly delayed.
During the course of the argument it was agreed that the parties
could
be ready for a final hearing with three months. There is
no suggestion that the secured property is falling in value and

in those circumstances I do not think the applicants should be
required to pay any part of the principal debt into court

pending the final hearing.

However it is not right that Glandore should have the use of
the respondent's money without
paying interest on it. There is
already an amount of $307,000 unpaid interest and expenses owing
to Elders and this must
be paid as a term of the grant of
interlocutory relief. Moreover, the unpaid interest must be
paid to Elders, and not into
court. This will ensure that
Elders has the use of the money pending the hearing, and will
reduce the amount of its mortgage
debt to about $1.5 million,
for which it will have security in excess of $4 million.
Because Elders does not appear to have
any immediate plans for
the sale of 'Oonavale' and as the applicants will want some time
to raise the $307,000 to pay Elders
I propose to give them until
14 January 1985 to pay the unpaid interest and expenses."

10. Next Mr. Swan referred to Andreas
and Angelatos and Ors v National
Australia Bank [1994] FCA 1223; (1994) ATPR 41-333. At p42-404, Branson J said:
"As Hedigan J stated in Nicholas John Holdings Pty Ltd v ANZ
Banking Group [1992] VicRp 98; (1992) 2 VR 715 the principle referred to in
Inglis' Case 'has caused judicial uneasiness from time to time'.
In Contractor Services Pty
Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd
(1990) ATPR 41-020 at p.51,355 French J stated:-

'The full impact of that (Inglis) condition has been
mitigated in cases where the claim is
said to go to the root of
the mortgagee's title, including the case in which relief is
sought under s.87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to vary or set
aside the mortgage.'

See also Graham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1988) ATPR
40-908; Glandore v Elders Finance and Investment Co Ltd [1984] FCA 407; (1984) 4
FCR 130 and Harvey v McWalters(sic) [1948] NSWStRp 58; (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173.

I accept the submission made on behalf of the applicants
that I have a discretion in the circumstances of this case not
to insist upon payment of the amount of the alleged debt into
court as a condition of any grant of any injunction in the
terms
sought. In my view the circumstances of the case render it
appropriate for such payment not to be insisted upon.
The
amount of the debt is large but the respondent holds security
not suggested to be inadequate for its payment. So far
as the
applicants are concerned, their case is that they may not be
called upon to pay the debt until some time early next
century.
They invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to make orders to
prevent or reduce the loss or damage suffered or likely
to be
suffered by them by the conduct of the respondent which they
seek to characterise as misleading or deceptive. The
capacity
of the Court to do so should they make out the case pleaded by
them is likely to be hampered should their circumstances
have
been significantly altered in the meantime as a consequence of
the need to raise A$7,700,000 for payment into court.

It follows that I do not accept the submission that as a
matter of law I am unable to grant the interlocutory relief

claimed in this matter. I turn to consider the two submissions
advanced on behalf of the respondent that in the exercise of
my
discretion I should refuse the relief sought."

11. In Mainbanner Pty Ltd and Ors v Dadincroft Pty Ltd and Ors (1988) ATPR
40-896 in the course of referring to the judicial tendency to relax the
requirements of the rule that a mortgagee will not be restrained
from
exercising its security rights at the incidence of the mortgagor unless the
amount, if it be disputed, is paid into court, Pincus
J in the Federal Court
agreed that he had some discretion to relax the requirements of the rule.
However, at p49,663 he said:

"In my opinion, it would, in general, not be correct to
exercise that discretion in favour of an applicant in a case
such
as this, merely on its being shown that there is a
prospect, however modest, of success of an allegation of oral
misrepresentation.
If that were so, the rule would be, in
effect, reversed, and would be that where misrepresentation is
alleged in such a
way that one could not deny the seriousness of
the question to be tried, and the applicant claims rescission,
prima facie
the contract the mortgagor and mortgagee have made
must be suspended.

It seems to me that the adoption of any such principle
would
be, in the long run, pernicious, because it would tend to
destroy or weaken people's confidence in such bargains and
in
the rights of holders of security."

12. The last of the cases referred to by Mr. Swan that I wish to mention is
Graham and
Ors v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1988) ATPR 40-908. At
p49,758, French J said:
"The Court is concerned here, of course, with the exercise
of a discretion and it is always a
dangerous course to extract
from earlier decisions exercising that discretion on particular
facts any general principles
purporting to fetter its exercise.
That is not to say, and should not be taken to imply, that the
observations of Pincus
J. on the importance of confidence in
bargains does not expose a significant and relevant factor which
will in most cases
be given considerable weight. But in the
end, each case is to be judged on its own facts."

13. Mr. Swan conceded that in none
of the cases to which he referred was it
shown that a party would be unable to continue the litigation unless the order
sought was
made.

14. In the course of his reasons in the case under appeal, Prior J said:
" A basis for the application now being sought
was that this
Court should not permit the plaintiff to take action outside of
the Court inconsistent with adjudication by
the Court of matters
at issue before it.

Counsel for the defendants relied upon an extempore judgment
in the Ontario
High Court: Canada Permanent Trust Co v Welton
(1973) 33 DLR (3d) 417. In an action for possession of
mortgaged lands and for payment due under a covenant, the
plaintiffs elected to proceed under
a power of sale under the
mortgage. The defendant sought an order restraining the
plaintiffs from proceeding with the sale
under the mortgage.
Zeber J said that whether the default under the mortgage
occurred or whether relief against forfeiture
should be granted
were matters for the trial, the question for him being whether
the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed
with a power of sale
outside the ambit of the action. It was his view that they
should not. He said, at 418:-

"The
plaintiffs come to this Court seeking certain relief,
the possession of land and the payment of the funds. Clearly if
the
funds were paid in response to this writ they would have to
then surrender the security back to the defendant. At the same

time, the plaintiffs are seeking to sell the mortgage premises
which, to my mind, almost negatives what they are doing in
the
action. They were then clearly, having sold the land, in a
position where they could not restore the security of the
defendant. In my view, the plaintiffs, having submitted their
rights to this Court, should not be allowed to then step outside
the ambit of this action and attempt to enforce their rights in
a different way, especially in view of the fact that there
appears to be a triable issue here.'

An injunction issued upon the Judge's view that it was not
fair and equitable to
allow the plaintiffs to exercise a power
concurrently with an attempt to enforce rights by way of action
in the Court. Counsel
also referred to Argyle Art Centre v
Argyle Bond and Free Stores (1976) 1 NSWLR 377 at 383, 384 and
386. It was contended that in this case the appointment of the
receiver of income was calculated to interfere
with the course
of justice in these proceedings. It was put that the Bank had
made an election to pursue a court remedy
by way of an action
for possession and in the alternative, for the appointment of a
receiver. Whilst the action is pending
in this Court, it is
submitted that the exercise of powers outside the Court,
calculated to interfere with the determination
of the issues in
the case, is open to restraint by proper order of the Court. It
is also put that a further factor of aggravation
in this case
justifying the grant of some order in restraint is that the
Bank's action is likely to render extremely difficult
the
abilities of the defendants to respond to the proceedings."

15. Prior J did not state whether or not he accepted the argument
based on
the Canada Permanent Trust Co and Argyle Art Centre cases. Because of what I
say later in these reasons, it is not strictly
necessary for me to comment on
the argument, but at present I am inclined to the view that the cases upon
which the argument is based
are distinguishable. This is not a case like
Canada Permanent Trust Co where the appellant is seeking to exercise its power
of sale
under the mortgages. And the Argyle Art Centre case was a landlord
and tenant case in which the head-tenant had given notice to
quit to a
sub-tenant and issued a summons for ejectment. During an adjournment of the
court hearing on the summons, the head-tenant
broke into the premises and was
engaged in clearing the sub-tenant's property out of them. In those
circumstances I can understand
the decision of Needham J to hold that an
election to proceed curially excluded the right to proceed physically.
Further, it was
not correct of counsel for the respondents to put to Prior J
(if he did) that "the bank had made an election to pursue a court remedy
by
way of an action for possession and in the alternative, for the appointment of
a receiver".

16. I am not sure about the precise
reason for his Honour's orders. Perhaps
it is to be contained in this passage towards the end of his judgment. He
says:
"With
respect to a further submission that the plaintiff's
action is not inconsistent with the issues before the Court I
incline
to the view that, in fact, to permit the Receiver to
take and retain monies is to assume issues in favour of the
plaintiffs.
On that ground I think some order must now be
made."

17. In an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and sworn on 28
June,
1994, James Michael Cudmore deposed inter alia:
"4. The land comprised in Certificate of Title Register
Book Volume
2563 Folio 198 known as 3 Ravendale Road Port
Lincoln (being one of the three properties, supra) is a property
on which is
situated 10 rental flats each of which are tenanted
for a rental of between $85.00 and $100.00 per week each. I am
informed
by Mr Zollo and verily believe that this is his
principal source of income.

5. I am informed by Mr Zollo and verily believe
that it
will be impossible to defend the within proceedings and also to
prosecute his proceedings against the Bank in action
number 1026
of 1993 if the income from his rental properties are not
available to him."

18. In his reasons, Prior J said:
" In support of the application the defendants refer to the
fact that income on ten rental flats amounts to a sum between
$850 and $1,000 per week, that sum being required to defend
these proceedings and prosecute the third matter which seeks
an
indemnity from the Bank pursuant to a contract of mortgage
insurance. There is evidence before the Court of the
impecuniosity
of the defendants. An affidavit from the
solicitor for the first defendant says that he believes it will
be impossible to
defend these proceedings and also to prosecute
the other if the income from the rental properties is not
available to the defendant."

19.
Although his Honour did not actually state whether he took into account
the respondent's alleged impecuniosity, it was referred
to by him in his
reasons, (as I have indicated), and it was certainly referred to frequently in
the course of the argument before
him. Counsel before this Court took
different stances on its relevance, and after hearing argument, the court
admitted two further
affidavits of Anthony John Crossman, a solicitor employed
by Finlaysons, solicitors for the appellant, one sworn on 5 December, 1994
and
the other sworn on 7 February, 1995. The affidavits were admitted on the
basis that they contained fresh evidence as to the
financial position of the
respondents as a result of discovery taking place after the judgment under
appeal. The court also admitted
an affidavit of the respondent Alessandro
Zollo sworn on 20 December, 1994. The financial position of the respondents
as revealed
by the additional affidavit material is not entirely clear because
discovery was incomplete, but it appears that the respondent is
receiving
$541.26 net per week from Workcover. However, he supports a wife and three
children aged between twelve and sixteen years
of age all living at home and
attending secondary school. He also deposed:
"I have had my accountant Mr Cunningham prepare a
summary of
income from the rental flats, rental homes and the rental shops
for the 1993/94 financial year. It shows rental
income of
$31,097.00 and expenses of $30,738.00. It is to the best of my
information and belief a true and accurate summary
of the income
and expenses from the rental properties ..."

20. Later he deposed:
"There are currently three Supreme Court
Actions between
myself and the bank. I am informed by my solicitors and verily
believe that each of the actions will proceed
to trial early in
1995. If the income from rental flats and rental homes is paid
into Court I will not have funds to defend
the within
proceedings or to prosecute actions No. 2031 of 1990 and 1026 of
1993 in which I am a plaintiff."

21. It is
necessary to remind oneself of the principles governing the grant
or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In Castlemaine Tooheys
Limited v
South Australia [1986] HCA 58; (1986) 161 CLR 148, Mason ACJ (as he then was) said at p153:
"In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must
show (1) that there is
a serious question to be tried ... (2)
that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will
not be an adequate
compensation unless an injunction is granted;
and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of
an injunction."

22. It is true that these principles do not apply in relation to paragraph 1
of the order (supra), but paragraph 1 would not be
of any real worth without
the injunction in paragraph 2. Prior J did not in terms refer to the
principles, but he did not have to
do so, and I am not persuaded that he
overlooked them.

23. Mr. Swan conceded there was "a serious question to be tried" and that
there was jurisdiction to make the orders. It is clear that if the
respondents are unable to defend or prosecute the respective
actions, they
will lose absolutely everything and will have no claim for damages.

24. The phrase "balance of convenience" is not
a very apt one. In the 3rd
Edition of "Equity Doctrines and Remedies" by Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, the
learned authors say at
p597:
"What is meant by saying that the court must take into
account the balance of convenience and the question of hardship
is that it must consider carefully what effects the granting of
an injunction will have on both parties, and in particular
whether to grant one would cause hardship to the defendant or to
refuse one would cause hardship to the plaintiff. It is
not
difficult to imagine circumstances in which the granting of an
interlocutory injunction would cause a defendant no hardship
whatever, eg an injunction restraining a defendant from
whistling in the street in such a manner as to constitute a
nuisance
to the plaintiff. On the other hand, in some
circumstances an injunction could cause grave hardship: it
could involve the
suspension of a defendant's business. The
greater the hardship to the defendant, the greater the
reluctance of the court
to grant the injunction; but, the more
it is apparent that an equal of further hardship would be caused
to the plaintiff
by refusing an injunction, or the stronger a
plaintiff's case appears, the more that reluctance will be
dissipated: Beese
v Woodhouse (1970) l All ER 769."

25. I also refer to the judgment of May LJ in Cayne v Global Natural
Resources plc (1984) l All
ER 225. At p237, his Lordship said:
"It is only thereafter, if damages after a trial are thought
to be inadequate, that
one is then enjoined to look at what is
described as the 'balance of convenience'. That is the phrase
which, of course,
is always used in this type of application.
It is, if I may say so, a useful shorthand, but in truth, and as
Lord Diplock
himself made clear in the NWL case, the balance
that one is seeking to make is more fundamental, more weighty,
than mere
'convenience'. I think that it is quite clear from
both cases that, although the phrase may well be substantially
less elegant,
the 'balance of the risk of doing an injustice'
better describes the process involved. Again, I need only refer
to a very
brief passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in the
NWL case (1979) 3 All ER 614 at 625, (1979) l WLR 1294 at
1306."

26. Mr. Swan strongly relied on the respondents' failure to make any payments
at all since
3 August, 1990, and on what he called the inadequacy of the
appellant's security. The mortgage debt now exceeds $800,000. There
was
affidavit evidence that the total value of the three properties in September
1990 was only $600,000. Mr. Carter inspected them
on 27 June, 1994, and said
they were not being properly maintained and were run down. The Valuer General
valued them at 27 May,
1994 at $530,000. Mr. Swan also argued that the
respondents' undertaking as to damages was of little or no value.

27. Whilst I
acknowledge the strength of these arguments, I have reached the
conclusion that they are outweighed by the respondents' argument
that they
would not be able to litigate if the order was not made, an argument that
gains strength when one considers that the rents
payable between the date of
the order and the date of the forthcoming trial would amount to a relatively
insignificant sum in relation
to the alleged debt. It is true that the
appellant now wants the rents to be paid into court, but such payments would
have the same
practical effect as payments to the appellant. It must also be
remembered that the respondent Alessandro Zollo has been on Workers
Compensation since 4 June, 1990.

28. Section 53(5) of the Law of Property Act, 1936 states:
"(5) The receiver may be removed,
and a new receiver may be
appointed, from time to time by the mortgagee by writing
under his hand."

29. It may be that
the learned Judge's use of the words "suspending" and
"suspension" was inappropriate. The mortgages are not before us. I would
dismiss the appeal, but I would hear counsel as to whether some minor
amendments should be made to the wording of the orders.

JUDGE2
KING CJ I concur.

JUDGE3
MILLHOUSE J I agree.

Authorities Cited1

Referred to (1)